A New Era of Water Quality Management in Agriculture: From Best Management Practices to Watershed-Based Whole Farm Approachers? by Ervin, David E
18
A NEW ERA OF WATER QUALITY MANAGEM ENT IN
AGRICULTURE: FROM BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES TO
WATERSHED-BASED WHOLE FARM APPROACHES?
David E. Ervin1
Professor, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics
Oregon State University
Why is reducing water pollution from agriculture such a
stubbornly slow process?  Despite several policy
initiatives since the 1970s, farms and ranches rank as the
primary contributors to impairments of the nation's
surface waters [U.S.EPA, 1994b].2 Emerging research
also points to agricultural chemicals in many cases of
groundwater contamination [Barbash and Resek; Mueller,
et al.]. After a little reflection, the industry's negative
distinction may not be surprising. Covering nearly half
the U.S. land base, crop and livestock production
inevitably alter natural vegetative cover, apply fertilizers,
pesticides and irrigation water, and involve animal
wastes. All of these processes can degrade water quality.
Without question, cases of water quality improvement as
well as degradation occur within agriculture's number one
ranking.  Stream, lake, and groundwater success stories
have come from federal, state, and local efforts.
However, the overall weight of the evidence indicates the
industry's performance needs to improve rather sharply if
the nation's water quality is to advance to a higher
plateau in line with broad public preference. 
This paper's central thesis is that dramatic changes in
program approaches are necessary for that advance
because of powerful budget, economic, and political
forces. Continued reliance on programs subsidizing or
regulating best management practices (BMPs) conflicts
with those forces in fundamental ways. Moreover,
promising technologies and improved water quality
science support more flexible, whole farm approaches for
targeted priority watersheds. 
Funding and Technical Challenges Impede Progress
Low funding levels have led the list of impediments to
more progress. Although the sheer scope and nature of
the production process almost guarantee widespread
water quality effects, program support to remedy those
problems has been meager. Consider that about $80-$100
billion of public funding was spent on water pollution
control during the 1980s. The major portion of that total
went for control of pollutants from municipal sources
entering streams, rivers, lakes, and estuaries. Yet, the
combined funding for agricultural initiatives -- the Model
Implementation Program (1970s), the Rural Clean Water
Program (1980), the Water Quality Special Projects
(1985), the USDA Water Quality Program (1990), and
the Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Amendments
(CZARA) -- have totaled only $1 or 2 billion over the last
two decades. Although we might expect municipal water
pollution control to cost more because of heavy
construction requirements, the disparity is striking. Most
of the agriculture-related water quality efforts have
focused on planning and pilot studies. And, the major
share of federal agricultural conservation program
funding over the last decade has been aimed at erosion
control with only secondary water quality purposes
[U.S.GAO, 1995].  In short, water quality problems
associated with agriculture have not been deemed a
funding priority by Congress.    
A key technical difficulty, the diffuse character of the
agricultural water pollution process, may have
contributed to low program funding.  Farm and ranch
water runoff and leaching problems usually come from
widespread "nonpoint" sources such that the pollution can
not be readily traced to  definable points. The science
describing the spatial and temporal processes and the
ultimate environmental implications of nonpoint water
pollution has been quite slow in developing. That means
the offending discharges can not be easily identified,
monitored, and controlled. Without better science, policy
makers may be understandably reluctant to launch large-
scale initiatives. But without making nonpoint problems
a national priority, Congress inhibits the growth of
necessary science. Enter the "chicken and egg problem",
which should come first? In addition, the diffuse,
insidious nature of much agricultural pollution does not
prompt major program responses that often follow large
environmental disasters such as rivers catching fire or
tanker spills.
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The vast diversity of the industry also poses special
technical challenges for programs. Even if the nonpoint
conundrum could be solved, consider structuring
permissible effluent levels or technology standards for
almost two million very different operations spread across
the countryside. It is no wonder that the standard
regulatory control approaches for other industries have
played minor roles in agriculture. The industry's diffuse
and diverse character make command and control
regulations very costly to implement if not technically or
administratively infeasible. Just the first step of
monitoring agricultural pollutants has proven a very
expensive task.  Moreover, agriculture has displayed
political prowess to resist the broad application of
environmental regulations. The recent shift in political
preference to favor approaches protecting farmer and
rancher property rights should strengthen this resistance.
 
Doubtful Effectiveness of Current Federal Program
Portfolio
Albeit with modest budget commitment, four approaches
have been used to improve agriculture's water quality
performance -- persuading operators to change damaging
practices through education and technical assistance,
subsidizing the adoption of new practices, regulating
limited serious identifiable problems, and requiring
certain practices in return for retaining eligibility for
other federal agricultural programs. How have they fared?
The predominant federal approach has been and remains
voluntary education and technical assistance programs
(often accompanied by subsidies) to implement "best
management practices.”3   For example, the federal
government sets water quality goals and standards
(primarily for drinking water purposes), delegates
responsibility for meeting the goals and standards to the
states, and works with the states through a variety of
programs that disperse education and technical
assistance. There is little evidence that voluntary
education and technical assistance programs produce
significant changes in producer behavior unless
accompanied by subsidies or regulation [U.S.
Congress,OTA, 1995a]. 
Subsidy programs can significantly change producer
behavior [Gale, et al]. Examples include the Agricultural
Conservation Program (ACP)4 that shares the cost of
installing practices, and the Conservation Reserve
Program (CRP) that permits operators to voluntarily
retire eligible cropland for 10 years in return for annual
rental payments. These programs, for the most part, have
not been targeted to water quality and other
environmental problems on the basis of the greatest social
return for dollars spent [Osborn; USDA,ERS, 1986].
And, their enduring effects once the subsidies expire
remain questionable.  For example, a previous episode of
land retirement in the 1960s revealed that farmers and
ranchers will return the vast majority of retired lands to
cultivation again [Osborn].  Unless the subsidies result in
permanent shifts in farming technologies and land use
that lower water pollution, the problems will reoccur.
With the exception of federal pesticide registration
programs, environmental regulations have been
sparingly applied to agriculture.  The review and
registration of pesticides to reduce excessive human and
environmental risks is an indirect route to water quality.
No doubt the screening and removal of these toxic
substances has spared waters from deleterious effects.
However, it is not clear that the registration process has
performed well from broader environmental perspectives,
and it may have hindered the timely development of more
benign compounds [Reichelderfer and Hinckle].  The
other principal regulatory effort has been to control point
sources of water pollution, such as confined animal
operations. However, the strictness of their application
has been quite uneven across states [Connelly]. The
implementation of CZARA in the early 1990s started
down a path of requiring uniform adoption of minimum
farm BMPs in all coastal zones, but has retreated from
that regulatory approach after objections by many states.
Although many states have submitted their CZARA plans
for EPA approval, their approaches will be less regulatory
than originally envisioned. In sum, the efficacy and cost
of environmental regulation related to agriculture
remains mostly undocumented and uncertain.   
"Compliance mechanisms" are a final distinct approach.
Introduced in the 1985 farm bill, they resemble regulation
in that they tie continued eligibility for agricultural
program benefits to acceptable erosion control and
wetland alteration practices.  These compliance schemes
are not true regulations, however, because the farmers
and ranchers can avoid the requirements by voluntarily
foregoing the agricultural program subsidies. The USDA,
in charge of implementing compliance measures, have
declared the measures quite successful [USDA,ERS,
1994], while independent evaluations have raised
questions about the extent of their efficacy [SWCS,
1992].  Regardless of their effectiveness, compliance
schemes ultimately suffer the same budget vulnerability
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as other subsidy approaches.  Except where compliance
requirements have encouraged operators to make
enduring practice shifts that increased profit, their long-
term efficacy is doubtful. Also, requiring operators of all
farmland receiving agricultural program benefits to meet
compliance standards spreads program resources across
a wide array of lands rather than targeting efforts at the
most serious problems.5
New Budget, Economic and Political Realities
Conflict with Current Approaches 
How might program reforms improve on this
questionable record?  A complicated set of budget,
economic and political forces shape the context for policy
innovation. 
Pressures to reduce the federal deficit will likely decrease
agricultural program funding leading to more reliance by
farmers and ranchers on market prices rather than
government programs.  Members of both agricultural
committees of Congress have proposed glidepaths for
reducing agricultural program support over the next five
to seven years. Proposals from the House and Senate
floors are more extreme calling for outright elimination.
The gradual erosion of agriculture's political base because
of fewer farmers and rural representatives, coupled with
unrelenting public sentiment to eliminate the budget
deficit, has raised the pressure for program reform to
unprecedented levels.
The final outcome is far from predictable, however,
because agricultural subsidies have proved so resilient to
attack. Some favor further restricting the portion of a
farm's cropland eligible for government payments
(termed  increased "flexibility"), and allowing farmers to
plant a wider range of crops on the "non-supported"
lands. Others simply want to gradually phase down the
price and income support levels and eventually eliminate
payments after a certain period. Still others want a
combination of both. Virtually all proposals share two
common objectives -- increase the farmer's reliance on
market prices for production decisions and increase the
operator's flexibility in choosing crops.   
Federal budget pressure will also likely constrict
traditional subsidy approaches to resolving agriculture's
water quality problems. Evidence for this proposition is
accumulating. A 1993 decision suspended further CRP
enrollment (much of which would have been targeted to
water quality problem areas) in favor of food assistance
programs. Another 1994 decision halved ACP program
funding. It is noteworthy that both actions were taken by
a Democratically-controlled Congress. The battle
continues with current farm bill debates about funding
conservation programs, such as the CRP, and other
environmental initiatives. The budget lesson is clear.
With a smaller budget pie, each slice becomes relatively
more valuable and political competition grows more
fierce.      
If significant commodity program reform materializes,
some general implications for water quality emerge.
Perhaps the most obvious consequence of phasing down
agricultural commodity programs is the decreasing
leverage for environmental compliance programs.  As
noted above, the overall effects of compliance measures
on soil erosion control and wetlands protection are
positive but debatable as to degree. Complete removal of
commodity program incentives will remove virtually all
compliance leverage and likely result in increased erosion
and wetland alteration, unless substitute programs are
implemented.
Effects on land values caused by commodity program
reform could also play longer-term roles. To the extent
commodity programs effectively restrict the supply of
farmland through required set asides and the CPR, or
otherwise raise the price of farmland, land values will fall
if reform lessens those provisions. Lower land prices
relative to non-land inputs will encourage the use of more
land and less non-land input use per acre, such as
agrichemicals [Miranowski, et al; Tobey and Reinert].
The total national use of fertilizers and pesticides depends
upon the offsetting influences of lower application rates
per acre versus more land in production. Overall erosion
would rise as the cultivated land base expands.
Simultaneously, farmers would shift their cropping
enterprises to grow less of the program crops receiving
lower support and more of those crops in demand by
market forces. 6  For example, the acreage of program
crops such as corn and wheat may fall, but soybean and
hay production could rise in some regions. There is also
evidence to indicate that commodity programs, by
artificially supporting crop prices, have masked the
effects of soil erosion and thereby inhibited conservation
investments that often benefit water quality [Orazem and
Miranowski]. 
Ultimately the total impacts of these land use shifts on
water quality depend on the environmental programs in
place, not on the changes in crop and livestock
enterprises and production practices. However, it is
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instructive to anticipate any shifts in production pressure
that will help anticipate water quality program needs. The
potential for water quality damage or improvement
depends on the how the particulars of reform interweave
with local agriculture and resource conditions. Simulation
analyses have shown both regional decreases and
increases in water pollutant loadings under possible
program reform paths [Miranowski, et al; Ervin et al.].
 
Of particular interest, farm-level responses should vary
widely due to their broad diversity and differing
dependencies on agricultural benefits. In the longer-run,
greater capacity to adjust to the changes would be
expected as farmers and researchers develop new
technologies to use more of the less expensive land and
fewer non-land inputs. Properly signaling the need for
technologies that attain water quality objectives while
simultaneously maintaining profit is a key public policy
action.
Superperimposed on this potential agricultural program
reform path are powerful forces pushing the
industrialization of agriculture [U.S. Congress,OTA,
1995a].  Fewer and fewer farms and ranches are
producing more and more of the output and controlling
more land and water use. And these industrial-style farms
are vertically integrating their input, production and
marketing processes to control price risk, product quality,
and better deliver the foods demanded by domestic and
foreign consumers. Global economic integration forces
building for the last two decades, enhanced by recent
global and regional free trade agreements, will likely
exacerbate the industrialization trend.  
The industrialization trends will eventually make it
necessary to deal with fewer units in implementing water
quality programs (and easier to implement regulations).
Many also expect that operators of industrialized farms
will be better able to develop, adopt, and adapt
environmental technology measures because of higher
management capacity. Firm evidence for or against this
expectation is lacking. A wide range of farm types could
emerge from the industrialization process, including
concentrated animal confinement operations, vertically
integrated specialty crop production, processing, and
marketing ventures, and simply larger land-extensive
crop and livestock farms. While all must make a profit in
the long term, different managers, even within one of the
farm types, can take very different approaches to
environmental protection depending upon their
preferences, skills, and other factors. Such a wide
diversity argues against standard BMP approaches to
water quality.   
The size of industrial operations may reach a point that
eventually hinders site-specific approaches to water
quality. Furthermore, the larger production units,
especially for animals, concentrates wastes and raises the
specter of large pollution spills that could precipitate
tighter regulation. Others fear that the divorce of
ownership from management that seems to accompany
industrialization may translate into a loss of farm
conservation incentives. One point is clear -- the full
implications of agricultural industrialization for progress
on water quality are unclear. The fundamental point
remains -- without a set of effective water quality
management institutions in place, industrialization will
lead to cases of improvement and degradation with a
uncertain total impact.
Recent political events and surveys have delivered mixed
messages for environmental management. Public opinion
polls taken after the 1994 elections show the vast majority
of citizens want more water quality improvement
[USDA,NRCS, 1995].  But the apparent shift to political
conservatism revealed by the 1994 elections portends
more reliance on state and local government approaches
emphasizing private initiative, and less on federal
intervention. The calls in agriculture for regulatory
reform and reversing losses in private property rights
illustrate this trend. It is too early to tell the duration and
eventual outcome of this political shift, or whether it
simply reflects short-term frustration with old programs
that unnecessarily restrain private innovation and
flexibility. But the need to downsize the budget deficit
reinforces the message of less reliance on federal
subsidies and centralized  planning of BMPs. Some role
for federal action will likely be necessary to resolve water
quality problems that transcend state borders
(transboundary problems), and to ensure national public
goods involving multiple states, e.g., habitat protection
for migratory wildlife. But the dominant movement for
agricultural water quality problems appears headed to
state, local, and private levels for political and federal
budget reasons.
Understanding these budget, economic and political
realities defines social forces affecting feasible policies.
But they describe only part of the picture and mostly
constraints.  An examination of  trends in technology
development and the latest scientific evidence about
agriculture's role in water quality helps define
opportunities. That knowledge helps identify promising
approaches to priority problem areas that hold the largest
potential environmental payoffs.
New Technology Enables Positive Economic and
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Environmental Performance
Agriculture is in the midst of an accelerating
technological revolution [U.S. Congress,OTA, 1992]. The
path that technology revolution travels will not only affect
the nature of the industrialization process but the capacity
of farms and ranches to achieve environmental objectives.
Biotechnology, advanced information systems for input
application, and biologically-based pest controls are just
a few that could transform food and fiber production. The
full impacts of these technologies are almost impossible
to fathom, much as we failed to anticipate the
extraordinary power of mechanical cultivation or
synthetic fertilizers and pesticides during this century.
Many of the new technologies hold the potential for water
quality improvement. Yet virtually all are being
developed with a dominant focus of increasing
productivity, and accidental or scant attention to
environmental effects. The lack of public and private
incentives for joining agricultural production and
environmental objectives in technology research and
development lies at the heart of the problem.
The dominance of production-related research is reflected
by nearly two thirds of public research funding going to
crop and livestock production categories, and only about
10 percent for natural resource and environmental topics
[USDA,CSRS]. It is understandable that private
technology development responds most forcefully to
productivity and profit potential.  But the strong public
sentiment for water quality improvements would seem to
support relatively more public research on natural
resource and environmental management. Indeed, a
compelling argument can be made for integrating
production and environmental objectives such that new
technologies not only enhance productivity and maintain
profit, but contribute to environmental objectives as well
[U.S. Congress,OTA, 1995a]. Without clear public policy
signals for such research and technology development,
these "complementary" technologies will languish. In the
absence of better integration of production and
environmental objectives, the very real possibility exists
that many of the promising technologies will cause
further water quality degradation.
Several advances over the past few decades give ample
reason to believe the potential for complementarity is
real. Conservation tillage (CT), soil nutrient testing
(SNT), and integrated pest management (IPM) may be
the most recognizable examples. Both  the private and
public sectors have played roles in their development and
application.
 
A variety of CT systems are transforming crop production
across the nation, now approaching 40 percent of the
planted acres [USDA,ERS, 1994]. Increasing application
indicates the systems are profitable for many farms by
saving fuel, labor, and machinery costs and only slightly
increasing aggregate fertilizer and pesticide amounts, but
maintaining or improving yields [USDA,ERS,1994]. The
total water quality effects of CT are often presumed
positive. By retaining more plant residue on the soil
surface, CT systems reduce erosion and water runoff
carrying sediment and agrichemicals to surface waters.
However, there is evidence that the increased infiltration
that accompanies less runoff may cause greater
groundwater contamination risks in some areas [Barbash
and Reseck]. So the net water quality effect of CT
remains uncertain where groundwaters are vulnerable. In
general, both the profit and environmental performance
of CT, and for that matter most other potential
complementary technologies, will vary by specific farm
and natural resource conditions. This basic insight has
profound implications for water quality programs. The
likelihood of a "technology silver bullet" for improving
agriculture's water quality performance is remote if not
impossible.  Site-specific assessment and management
decisions are necessary to ferret out the most appropriate
responses for each farm.
Soil nutrient testing also appears to satisfy the dual profit
and environmental improvement criteria in some areas.
For example, recent evidence shows Pennsylvania
farmers voluntarily reduced their nitrogen fertilizer
applications by about one third when using pre-sidedress
soil nitrogen testing [Musser, et al.]. The cost savings
translated into profit increases from $3.70 to $13.50 per
acre and reduced excess nitrogen in the soil profile that
could migrate to surface and ground waters. The
Pennsylvania findings corroborate those for a similar
analysis of Iowa farmers [Babcock and Leamer].
A recent comprehensive review of the performance of
integrated pest management (IPM) also concluded that
the application of those systems generally improved profit
and lowered pesticide applications [Norton and Mullen].
Potential water quality improvements must be inferred
from lower application levels. As for CT, the IPM and
SNT findings of complementarity pertain to specific
farms and areas. Generalization must proceed very
carefully based on agricultural and resource conditions.
                      
A number of other technologies appear poised to offer
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substantial complementary benefits [U.S. Congress,OTA,
1995b]. Preliminary results indicate management
intensive grazing systems often used in dairy systems can
increase profit, lower grain production requirements, and
reduce risks associated with concentrated animal waste
storage and disposal. Organic crop production systems
involve no synthetic pesticide or fertilizer applications,
plus build better soil structure to retard other water
pollution. "Precision farming" refers to site-specific
management of fertilizers, pesticides, and irrigation water
within fields. This family of technologies uses advanced
information systems, such as nutrient testing devices,
yield monitors and global positioning systems, to offer the
potential of reducing excessive input applications that can
impair ground and surface waters. The development and
application of these promising technologies is now
principally and understandably guided by private profit
motives. Those motives will include some private on-farm
soil and water conservation incentives, but will not
incorporate off-farm water quality objectives unless public
or private  institutions create incentives to do so.
An overarching and common-sense lesson emerges from
this review. The application of these technologies to
improve profit and environmental conditions depends
upon site-specific farm/ranch and natural resource
conditions. Universal prescriptions of  BMPs for certain
classes of resources within even a relatively small region,
let alone national coverage, will miss important
differences in farm goals, management ability, varying
assimilative capacities of natural resources to
degradation, plus a host other factors. Sufficient
management expertise appears to be the critical factor in
successfully applying this new generation of technologies
[U.S. Congress,OTA, 1995b].  Thus new water quality
programs for agriculture that emphasize the application
of complementary technologies will need to find public or
private ways to deliver that management training,  
Improved Science Helps Identify Priority Targets
The challenge to fashion water quality programs that
foster site-specific management and technology
innovation is coming into focus. But is there sufficient
science to support this site-specific thrust in the policy
process? In other words, can we be reasonably sure that
we are not missing important targets and wasting public
resources?  Do we understand the interrelationships
among various environmental media well enough to
factor in compounding or offsetting influences on water
quality? Can we develop performance criteria to guide the
development and application of such programs that
encourage private sector innovation and flexibility?
Any self respecting scientist studying agriculture and
water quality will likely answer a resounding no. We
always need better science almost by definition. This
paper has already explained the challenging technical
problems posed by agricultural nonpoint pollution and the
low scientific funding on those issues. But consider three
themes of recent scientific advances related to agriculture
and water quality to see if a modest beginning at program
restructuring is feasible.
 
First, research institutions are systematically developing
a better understanding of the regional and state patterns
of water quality related to agriculture. Most notably, the
U.S. Geological Survey's activities, including the
National Water Quality Assessment (NAWQA) program
and other efforts, are helping identify the role of
agriculture in water quality around the country. Although
these assessments do not constitute a representative
sampling (because available information bases do not
permit such a sampling), they are the most complete
scientific appraisal of water quality processes to date.
Regrettably, the U.S. Department of Agriculture's
comprehensive natural resource database on non-federal
lands, the National Resources Inventory (NRI), does not
collect water quality information to augment the
NAWQA data.
Preliminary findings from the NAWQA analyses support
the general conclusion that agriculture plays a leading
role in surface water quality problems and nutrients in
groundwaters in many regions [Mueller et al.; Smith,
Schwarz and Alexander]. Results on pesticides in
groundwater quality are not yet complete but should be
available shortly [Barbash and Resek]. This broad
assessment also stresses that water quality conditions
related to agriculture vary  considerably by region and by
watershed. The regional and local diversity in
environmental processes surfaces again.
The USGS assessments also draw on related water quality
appraisals conducted by state and local scientists and
government agencies working with USGS staff. The
resultant total database was judged sufficiently reliable to
identify the 10 highest priority problem areas for
improving surface water quality related to agriculture
[U.S. Congress,OTA, 1995b]. A similar assessment for
groundwater problems should be possible in the near
future. Thus science concerning water quality problems
related to agriculture has advanced such that priority
targets can be selected for focusing program efforts rather
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than addressing general classes of problems and lands.
Second, a near scientific consensus seems to be
developing that water quality management needs to
proceed on a watershed basis [Knopman, et al, 1994].
Field by field and farm by farm approaches to water
quality taken in the past are increasingly seen as
piecemeal efforts with low likelihood of producing
effective and enduring solutions. Because streams, rivers,
lakes and aquifers are interlinked in hydrological
systems, designing measures to affect an area's water
quality necessarily requires consideration of components
in the system. For example paying to retire highly
erodible cropland in one part of a watershed may be
negated by other farms plowing steep pasture lands when
crop prices jump.
The recognition that water quality processes are governed
by larger environmental units than fields or farms is
fundamental to guiding site-specific management actions.
For example, NAWQA assessments have used watersheds
as basic building blocks. There is considerable science to
guide these watershed efforts [U.S. EPA, 1994a].
However, adaptive management, a process of using
management programs as experiments and allowing for
feedback, will likely play a role as we learn more about
how to manage diverse landscapes [Lee]. Some existing
programs already operate on this basis, such as the
special hydrologic unit area designations as part of the
USDA's water quality programs. Many state programs are
also organizing water quality efforts around the
watershed concept. So this scientific principle to help
build better water quality programs is already being used,
but needs to be more broadly embraced by a new
generation of programs.  
Finally, science increasingly accepts the need to
incorporate the interrelationships among environmental
processes within ecosystems in management approaches
[Morrisey]. Water quality invariably depends on soil
quality and may depend heavily on air quality as
evidenced by nitrogen deposition from atmospheric
sources [NRC, 1993]. Also, water quality not only affects
human health but also influences the condition of aquatic
habitat for wildlife using the water resources. Thus
setting water quality performance levels requires explicit
recognition of those interacting effects to attain ecosystem
health. The science of ecosystem management is gaining
ground but quite immature. At this point it is not possible
to formulate water quality performance targets based on
full ecosystem interactions. But the need to recognize
those interactions should not constrain approaches that
partially incorporate known interrelationships, such as
working on soil quality as a buffer to water pollution.
Taking Some Preliminary Steps to Program Reform
 
Federal policy developments for agriculture and related
environmental issues have generally taken modest
incremental steps. The compliance mechanisms of the
1985 farm bill and the CZARA could be interpreted as
exceptions to that generalization, but in practice they
have departed less from the traditional mold than
expected upon passage. Some have argued that the
incremental approach is not only preferred for political
reasons but also justified when science is uncertain about
the effects of large dramatic shifts [Lindblom]. 
If the budget, economic, and political trends are indeed
forcing a reconsideration of water quality programs, the
1995 farm bill and Clean Water Act reauthorization are
opportune times to experiment. Clearly, large federal
initiatives of the old subsidy variety will be difficult if not
impossible under the current budget-cutting pressures.
Fresh approaches that empower more state and local
efforts,  allow private flexibility, encourage
complementary public/private technology development,
and concentrate program efforts on priority areas stand
the best chance. Rarely do political circumstance and
emerging science so nicely converge to provide mutual
support for program innovation.
Three basic steps flow from the examination of social
trends, technology developments, and scientific advances.
There is only space here to outline their general nature,
but the implicit principles could guide a new generation
of programs. 
Target program efforts at priority areas and
watersheds.  
More effective targeting conserves scarce budget
resources, lessens unnecessary burdens on farmers and
ranchers that can constrain competitiveness, and gives a
better chance of developing a critical mass of program
resources to deliver water quality improvements. To a
limited extent, this type of targeting is already underway
in post-1990 CRP enrollments and some agricultural
water quality programs. However, it remains incomplete
and would benefit from Congressional sanction in the
farm bill and Clean Water Act.
In addition to understandable political resistance from
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redistributing program funds, targeting has been inhibited
by incomplete databases and immature science, especially
at the national level. However, those obstacles can be
overcome by employing a panel of leading scientists and
other experts to identify water quality priority areas [U.S.
Congress,OTA, 1995b.] This selection process has the
advantage of panelists augmenting the best published
data with expert judgment, theirs and colleagues, to fully
exploit the scientific base. Federal agencies responsible
for water quality management related to agriculture could
structure such a targeting process that first involved
national-level designations, to be followed by state and
local processes that refine targets within those
designations. By illustration, large portions of the Corn
Belt may be selected as prime contributors to water
quality degradation in the Lower Mississippi River
system, but representatives from Iowa, Illinois, Indiana,
Missouri, and Ohio could further delimit the key
watersheds requiring program attention. This joint
federal-state-local process would not apply of course to
water quality efforts initiated solely within the states.    
 
Devise Simplified Strategic Programs for Targeted
Priorities   
At least 40 separate federal programs apply to
environmental management related to agriculture [U. S.
Congress,OTA, 1995a]. A large number of those
programs directly or indirectly pertain to water quality.
Farmers and ranchers can understandably incur high
administrative costs in dealing with these multiple
education, technical assistance, subsidy, compliance, and
regulatory efforts. Also, they may have the frustrating
experience of conflicting program rules, if not at the
federal level, then between state and federal programs.
Pleas for program simplification are therefore not
surprising.
The simplified structure could follow three general
strategies [U.S. Congress,OTA, 1995b]:
• Promote the adoption of "readily available"
complementary technologies, e.g., CT, IPM, and
SNT, primarily through education and technical
assistance efforts to enhance management skills.
• Encourage other technologies through incentives or
disincentives that involve some cost but achieve
environmental objectives and keep land in
production, e.g., riparian buffer strips, waste
lagoons.
• Voluntarily retire selected farmlands for long periods
when foreseeable agricultural production and desired
environmental performance are incompatible, e.g.,
critical wetlands and very highly erodible lands in non-
attainment watersheds.
Traditional program efforts heavily emphasize the second
and third strategies using subsidies, but will run up
against continuing budget pressures. The new approach
would place most emphasis on the first strategy that takes
maximum advantage of private incentives and thereby
lowers public cost. It would also be backed up by vigorous
public/private research and development programs to
deliver more complementary technologies for water
quality. A major weakness of past farm bills has been
inattention to such environmental technology in the
research title.
It is unrealistic to expect that complementary
technologies will apply to all situations, especially in the
short-term, or that they will do the entire job. However,
they merit first consideration for cost and private
flexibility reasons. Where they are not available or are
insufficient to remedy the problems, the second approach
can be applied, always seeking the lowest cost measure
that provides the greatest likelihood of enduring private
protection. Only as a last resort would farmlands be
retired with full public payment.    
Use Whole-Farm Approaches to Implement Program
Strategies 
For political and economic reasons, greater emphasis on
private initiative will be necessary to make significant
progress on water quality in agriculture. Centralized
programs pushing one-size-fits-all BMPs run counter to
prevailing political sentiment and good economics. More
flexibility for operators to design site-specific approaches
will generally lower the private and public cost of
meeting water quality requirements. The operator is in a
unique position to consider all of the technical, economic,
and resource  relationships that must be balanced to meet
private goals or public purposes. The need to consider the
full set of ecosystem relationships in water quality
management noted above has a corollary in farm and
ranch management.
The concept of a whole farm management plan to
integrate and coordinate private production decisions
across farm enterprises has been around for decades. But
now it is being extended to include natural resource and
environmental management considerations. Yet there has
been little systematic study or development of this broader
version. Despite some fears that the plans risk federal
land use restrictions, just the opposite of what is intended,
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the concept enjoys broad appeal in political, scientific,
and industry circles. However, we are in uncharted
territory to a large extent. These plans should be very
different from past exercises of constructing lists of best
available technologies.
Conceptually the planning process begins with an
assessment of on-farm natural, human, and capital
resources and all off-farm environmental resources
affected by the operation. It is essential that the watershed
and ecosystem interactions described above be
incorporated to capture the full off-site implications of
farm actions. A plan is then prepared to integrate
production and environmental management within the
unique resources, management, and other farm attributes.
Relying on whole farm plans to meet multiple program
requirements should not only exploit farmer ingenuity but
reduce compliance burdens. They may also serve as a
form of regulatory relief if successful application of the
plan is ruled as satisfying wetlands, water quality, and
other requirements, and therefore receiving immunity
from suits brought under environmental statutes.
Four minimum conditions must be met before this
modern version of whole farm planning can realize its
substantial potential [Ervin and Smith]. First, explicit and
measurable environmental performance targets must be
established to guarantee the achievement of public
objectives. Implementing a plan that satisfies these
performance targets gives the farmer incentive to avoid
the alternative program oute of regulation and other
forms of compliance. Second, all agencies and
stakeholders must be involved in the setting of those
environmental targets to avoid later reversals or
unnecessary actions. Achieving agreement among
multiple federal agencies and companion state agencies
will be a huge task, not to mention industry and
environmental groups. Third, the farmer must participate
voluntarily to assure the performance targets and
guidelines are not so demanding or inflexible that they
negate private innovation and volunteerism. Finally, the
whole farm monitoring and certification should be
privatized. Existing federal agencies simply do not have
the resources or expertise to construct the diversity of
plans that will be demanded. The government's role can
be one of licensing and overseeing the private planning
industry.        
These steps are of course only sketchy outlines of action.
Other perplexing questions and challenges remain. Who
will provide the leadership for bringing such proposals
before Congress and mustering the necessary political
support? Ideally, a coalition of private agricultural and
environmental groups are best equipped to fashion a
workable approach that satisfies both major interest
groups. The farm and ranch industry needs to recognize
that the program path of mostly voluntary/subsidy
programs has not abated the public's desire for water
quality improvements. In fact, the majority of that public
favors  increased regulation, even after the 1994 election
[USDA,NRCS, 1995]. So proactive efforts by the
agricultural industry may avert poor decisions. Lobbying
for increased research on complementary technology
development would be a natural early action.
The environmental groups should recognize that the old-
style command and control regulation so often relied on
for other industries will not produce the same results in
agriculture for good technical and economic reasons. If it
is tried and found unworkable, the strategy could backfire
causing worse water conditions as the programs are
disassembled. Their main challenge should be to lead the
definition of reasonable environmental performance
targets that farmers and ranchers can respond to in
innovative ways. Here, the scientific community,
government and academe, must step out of its ivory
towers and provide the best information upon which to
make tough judgments when the environmental processes
and possible outcomes are inherently uncertain.
Finally, what agencies will collaborate to provide the
necessary program integration to carry out a new
generation of programs? Experience with present water
quality programs does not indicate the federal agriculture
and environmental agencies work that well together. This
outcome should not be surprising because they have very
different primary missions, enhancing production or
protecting environmental quality. Perhaps a new
generation of approaches with redefined roles of mostly
assisting private sector solutions would help solve the
territorial disputes. Congressional programs that help tie
production and environmental quality goals and actions
together would help neutralize the old tension.
Notwithstanding these remaining challenges, targeting
high priority areas and implementing simplified
programs under whole farm approaches responds to the
prevailing budget, economic, and political conditions.
Moreover, recent advances in science and technology
development give encouragement that public and private
costs can be kept down in making enduring progress on
water quality.
Endnotes
1 Serving as Senior Analyst, Environment Program,
Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress while
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this paper was prepared.  I have benefited from extensive
discussion with Elisa Graffy on water quality issues
related to agriculture, and from helpful comments by
Benno Warkentin and Jeff Zinn.  Any remaining errors
remain my sole responsibility.
2 More specifically, agriculture was identified as the
primary source of pollution to rivers, lakes, and coastal
estuaries in 32 states [US Congress, OTA, 1995a].
Because not all states reported sources of pollution to
rivers and streams, and to lakes, ponds, and reservoirs,
the total of 32 could underestimate agriculture’s role.
Some in scientific and policy communities may quarrel
with the quality of these EPA data because a standard
protocol is not used to ensure high quality, comparable
information from all states.  Indeed, such a protocol can
not be legally instituted under current federal statutes.
However, other independent scientific assessments are
corroborating agriculture’s key role [Barbash and Resek;
Mueller et al; Smith, et al].
3 These management practices are “best” in the sense that
they are considered technically feasible and effective in
controlling water pollution, and estimated to be cost
effective.  The cost effectiveness determination for
hypothetical farms and ranches can be misleading in
program application because it can not capture important
farm-specific factors, such as management expertise,
special resource conditions, and other important
influences on environmental and economic performance.
4 The Water Quality Incentives Program (WQIP),
approved in the conservation title of the 1990 farm bill,
is a good example of this approach--in return for
implementing approved water pollution control practices,
operators receive financial assistance to offset some of the
practice costs.  The WQIP was designed as a stand-alone
program, but was eventually implemented as a special
practice under the ACP.  Although the program was
expected to be a major initiative, annual appropriations
total are only $15 million, with less than $60 million
expended to date.  Reasons for the low level of funding
likely stem from political conflicts among agricultural
and environmental interest groups and government
agencies, plus continuing budget pressure.
5 The same criticism can be leveled at the wetlands
alteration compliance scheme known as “Swampbuster”
which applies to all wetlands on farms enrolled in
agricultural programs.
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